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Current cognitive models stress the importance of negative self-perceptions in maintaining social
anxiety, but focus predominantly on content rather than structure. Two studies examine the role of self-
structure (self-organisation, self-complexity, and self-concept clarity) in social anxiety. In study one, self-
organisation and self-concept clarity were correlated with social anxiety, and a step-wise multiple
regression showed that after controlling for depression and self-esteem, which explained 35% of the
variance in social anxiety scores, self-concept clarity uniquely predicted social anxiety and accounted for
an additional 7% of the variance in social anxiety scores in an undergraduate sample (N¼ 95) and the
interaction between self-concept clarity and compartmentalisation (an aspect of evaluative self-orga-
nisation) at step 3 of the multiple regression accounted for a further 3% of the variance in social anxiety
scores. In study two, high (n¼ 26) socially anxious participants demonstrated less self-concept clarity
than low socially anxious participants (n¼ 26) on both self-report (used in study one) and on compu-
terised measures of self-consistency and conﬁdence in self-related judgments. The high socially anxious
group had more compartmentalised self-organisation than the low anxious group, but there were no
differences between the two groups on any of the other measures of self-organisation. Self-complexity
did not contribute to social anxiety in either study, although this may have been due to the absence of
a stressor. Overall, the results suggest that self-structure has a potentially important role in under-
standing social anxiety and that self-concept clarity and other aspects of self-structure such as com-
partmentalisation interact with each other and could be potential maintaining factors in social anxiety.
Cognitive therapy for social phobia might inﬂuence self-structure, and understanding the role of
structural variables in maintenance and treatment could eventually help to improve treatment outcome.
 2010 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.Current cognitive models of social phobia emphasise the role of
mental representations of the self in maintaining social anxiety
(Clark & McManus, 2002; Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg,
1997), and according to Moscovitch (2009), fear of exposing the
self is the ‘core fear’ in social phobia. These claims rest primarily on
studies that have focused on the content of the self-concept. This
content is formed by negative beliefs and assumptions about the
self, and negative images of self-reported by socially phobic and
socially anxious individuals (e.g. Hackmann, Surawy, & Clark, 1998;
Schulz, Alpers, & Hoffmann, 2008; Stopa & Clark, 1993; Tanner,
Stopa, & De Houwer, 2006; Turner, Johnson, Beidel, Heiser, &
Lydiard, 2003). Experimental manipulations of positive and nega-
tive self-images indicate that they may have causal, as well as
maintaining effects, on social anxiety (e.g. Hirsch, Clark, Mathews,7; fax: þ44 (0) 23 8059 2588.
 license.& Williams, 2003; Hirsch, Mathews, Clark, Williams, & Morrison,
2006).
Any negative self-representation, according to Showers and
Zeigler-Hill (2006) depends both on the availability (i.e., content)
of self-knowledge and on the accessibility of this knowledge. They
argue that accessibility is partly determined by the structure of self-
knowledge and that structure maymoderate the impact of negative
self-knowledge on self-esteem and depression. Self-structure refers
to the way in which self-knowledge is organised and will be dis-
cussed in more detail below.
The accessibility of self-representations is at the centre of
Brewin’s (2006) retrieval competition hypothesis. He argues that
different self-representations compete and that the effectiveness of
cognitive therapy depends not so much on changing negative self-
representations, as on making competing positive self-represen-
tations more accessible. According to Brewin, access to any given
self-representation depends on multiple factors including the
individual’s current emotional and physiological state, the available
retrieval cues and contexts, autobiographical memories that
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beliefs, attitudes and assumptions about the self. It may also
depend on the way in which the information about the self is
structured.
If accessibility (i.e. structure) is important in addition to avail-
ability (i.e. content), and if the self does indeed play a fundamental
role in maintaining social anxiety, then we need to look at the role
of self-structure in social anxiety, as well as investigating the
contents of self-representations. The aim of this paper is to inves-
tigate whether three elements of self-structure, namely, evaluative
self-organisation, self-complexity, and self-concept clarity, are
related to social anxiety in a non-clinical sample. These three
different aspects of self-structure are described below together
with comments on their potential role in maintaining social
anxiety.
Evaluative self-organisation (Showers, 1992, 2000) refers to the
way in which positive and negative self-beliefs are distributed
between different aspects of the self. A self-aspect refers to
a particular self-deﬁned role (e.g. parent, friend, scientist, engineer)
that has a set of attributes associated with it. These attributes can
be positive (e.g. kind, loyal, and creative) or negative (e.g. dishonest,
selﬁsh, and boring). In Showers’model there are two different types
of evaluative self-organisation: evaluative compartmentalisation
and evaluative integration. For individuals with a compartmental-
ised self-organisation, each self-aspect contains primarily positive
or primarily negative information (e.g. a kind, caring, loving son,
but a selﬁsh, thoughtless, and indifferent friend), whereas, indi-
viduals with an integrated self-organisation have overlapping
attributes in their different self-aspects (e.g. a loving, caring,
thoughtless and selﬁsh son). Evaluative self-organisation also
incorporates the importance of the various different attributes to
the individual, so an individual who rates positive attributes as
more important than negative attributes is described as having
a positively compartmentalised or positive-integrated self-organi-
sation, whereas an individual who rates negative attributes as more
important has a negatively compartmentalised or negative-inte-
grated self-organisation.
Self-organisation is not static and can change in response to life
events and in the course of therapy (Showers, Limke, & Zeigler-Hill,
2004). Although compartmentalisation confers some beneﬁts (for
example, it requires fewer cognitive resources than integration),
there are also some costs. Positive compartmentalisation is asso-
ciated with higher self-esteem and more positive mood than
integrated self-organisation. However, negative compartmentali-
sation is associated with lower self-esteem and more negative
mood than negative-integrated self-organisation. When an indi-
vidual with a positively compartmentalised self-organisation is
faced with a stressor, this may trigger the activation of negatively
compartmentalised aspects of self, and because these self-aspects
do not contain any positive information to buffer them, the indi-
vidual may be ﬂooded with negative information (semantic and
affective information associated with that self-aspect). Showers
et al. (2004) argue that, although psychological treatment does
not explicitly set out to change self-structure, it may in fact do so.
Therapy may facilitate a move from a more compartmentalised to
a more integrated self-organisation, in which information of the
opposite valence acts as a buffer, thereby reducing extreme reac-
tions (Showers, 1992).
Although most of the research into self-organisation has been
done by social psychologists, Taylor, Morley, and Barton (2007)
demonstrated that remitted bipolar disorder and recovered
depressed groups both had more compartmentalised self-organi-
sation than non-patient controls, and they suggest that increased
compartmentalisation may be a general feature of mood disorders.
Compartmentalised self-organisation might contribute to thedepression that frequently accompanies social phobia, but could it
also contribute directly to social anxiety? There is one study that
provides indirect support for the idea that it might. In an unselected
sample of undergraduate participants, Zeigler-Hill and Showers
(2007) found that individuals with compartmentalised self-orga-
nisation were more sensitive to lab-based social rejection and had
more unstable self-esteem than individuals with integrated self-
organisation.
The second structural aspect of the self that we investigate in
this paper is Linville’s (1985) model of self-complexity. In this
model, high self-complexity is preferable to low self-complexity
because it modulates affective reactions. Self-complexity refers to
both the number of self-aspects with which individuals deﬁne
themselves and the degree of overlap between them. More self-
aspects and less overlap constitute greater self-complexity. Linville
(1987) argues that a stressful life event will activate the self-aspects
most relevant to that event. If the individual has a lot of self-aspects,
then only a small proportion of the self is affected. Minimal overlap
also means that other related self-aspects are less likely to be
activated, and thus high complexity has a protective effect.
However, there is mixed support for this hypothesis and in a recent
meta-analysis, Rafaeli-Mor and Steinberg (2002) found only weak
support for Linville’s (1985) claim that high self-complexity is
associated with better psychological well-being.
Despite the lack of robust support for the stress-buffering effects
of self-complexity, there are other routes through which self-
complexity might inﬂuence social anxiety. Renaud and McConnell
(2002) found that low self-complexity was associated with
a bigger rebound effect on a thought suppression task. Post-event
processing (PEP) is a common and distressing response to social
events among socially phobic individuals (Rachman, Gruter-
Andrew, & Shafran, 2000), and attempts to suppress intrusive
thoughts during PEP could produce a rebound effect that makes it
harder to terminate processing, thus increasing distress. McConnell
et al. (2005) demonstrated that greater self-complexity was asso-
ciated with poorer physical and psychological outcomes, but only
for people who believed that they had little control over their
various self-aspects. Many socially phobic individuals believe that
they are socially inept and cannot create the desired social
impression, which leads to anxiety. For an individual with low self-
complexity, this self-aspect may be a prominent part of his or her
general self-concept and could contribute to a feeling that “this is
the way I am”, resulting in a sense of hopelessness. In the current
study, we wanted to explore whether high or low self-complexity
was associated with higher levels of social anxiety, but given the
extant literature, it was not possible to make a clear directional
prediction.
The self is a complex multi-dimensional entity and this raises
the question of how individuals maintain a coherent sense of self,
and brings us to our ﬁnal structural concept, namely self-concept
clarity. Self-concept clarity describes the degree to which “the
contents of the self are clearly and conﬁdently deﬁned, internally
consistent, and temporally stable” (Campbell, Assanand, & Di Paula,
2003, p. 122). Baumgardner (1990) suggests that a high degree of
certainty about one’s self-concept can contribute to a sense of
control about future outcomes, which in turn supports a positive
and conﬁdent view of self. Conversely, uncertainty about the self-
concept is associated with low self-esteem, less positive affect
towards the self, temporal instability in self-descriptions, and lower
congruence between perceptions of current and past behaviours
(e.g. Baumgardner, 1990; Campbell, 1990). People with low self-
concept clarity are likely to be more vulnerable to the effects of
external stimuli. This may help to explain why perceptions about
the outcome of social events impact on feelings of self-worth in
individuals with social phobia to a greater extent than either
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Foa, 2000).
There is already some evidence that people with social phobia
are less certain about themselves. Wilson and Rapee (2006) found
that socially phobic participants rated more negative personality
traits and fewer positive personality traits as self-descriptive
compared to non-patient controls, even after controlling for
depression. Socially phobic participants were also less conﬁdent
about their ratings (both positive and negative) and took longer to
make self-relevant decisions on a reaction time task than controls.
Wilson and Rapee suggest that lack of certainty about personality
traits might result in socially phobic individuals giving undue
weight to other people’s opinions (or at least to their beliefs about
other people’s opinions), and therefore uncertainty could
contribute to the maintenance of the disorder. Moscovitch, Orr,
Rowa, Reimer, and Antony (2009) compared socially phobic indi-
viduals with healthy controls using a modiﬁed version of the
Pelham and Swann’s (1989) self-attributes questionnaire, and
showed that the patient group rated themselves more negatively
than the controls on a range of personality attributes. The controls
attributedmore certainty and importance to the positive attributes,
whereas the socially phobic individuals did not showany difference
in certainty and importance ratings between positive and negative
traits, suggesting the absence of a positive bias that, if present,
could be beneﬁcial in maintaining high levels of self-esteem and
conﬁdence in the self.
The two studies described in the present paper build on a sparse
literature about the role of self-structure in the maintenance of
social anxiety by examining the roles of self-organisation, self-
complexity, and self-concept clarity in social anxiety. In the ﬁrst
study, we used a correlational design to examine the associations
between social anxiety and the different components of self-
structure, and then conducted a regression analysis to assess the
contribution of different aspects of self-structure to social anxiety.
Social anxiety does not exist in a vacuum and is frequently
accompanied by depression and low self-esteem. However, despite
the fact that there is shared variance between the three constructs,
they can be meaningfully distinguished. For example, Gibb, Coles,
and Heimberg (2005) showed that the Liebowitz Social Anxiety
Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987), and the Social Anxiety Interaction
and Social Phobia Scales (SIAS and SPS: Mattick & Clarke, 1998)
could reliably distinguish social anxiety from depression. As the
LSAS is clinician rated and as social interaction anxiety is likely to
produce the best range of scores in a non-clinical population, we
chose the SIAS to measure social anxiety in our samples.
The low self-esteem associated with both social anxiety and
depression reﬂects the negative view of self that characterises both
disorders and is often used to link them (Tennen & Afﬂeck, 1993;
Wood & Lockwood, 1999; see Roberts, 2006, for a review).
However, social phobia is not limited to negative beliefs about the
self, and in one recent study (Kocovski & Endler, 2000), self-esteem
was not a direct predictor of social phobia in a multiple regression
analysis; the relationship between self-esteem and social anxiety
was mediated by fear of negative evaluation. We measured self-
esteem and depression in the regression because of the overlap
between the three constructs and we wanted to test whether self-
structure independently contributes to social anxiety after
controlling for them. In the second study, we screened participants
with the SIAS and selected high and low social anxiety groups,
who were then compared on the various measures of self-
structure.
The main hypotheses in the ﬁrst study were as follows. One, we
predicted that negative compartmentalisation, and lower self-
concept clarity would be associated with social anxiety. Two,
following Showers (1992; Showers & Kling, 1996), we predictedthat individuals with a compartmentalised self-organisation who
rated positive self-aspects as more important than negative would
experience lower levels of social anxiety than those who rated
negative self-aspects as most important. Our third prediction was
more speculative. We were interested in whether self-organisation
and self-concept clarity might interact, and although Campbell
et al. (2003) failed to ﬁnd any correlations between these two
measures of self-structure, two recent studies provided some
indirect support for this hypothesis. Ayduk, Gyurak, and Luerssen
(2009) showed that rejection and interpersonal conﬂict reduced
state self-concept clarity, and Boyce (2009) found that positive
integration was associated with higher self-concept clarity and
produced less confusion and a less intense emotional reaction
when individuals were given the task of integrating new self-
knowledge. Accordingly, we tentatively predicted that individuals
with more integrated self-organisation and higher self-concept
clarity would report less social anxiety than those with more
compartmentalised self-organisation and lower levels of self-
concept clarity. Finally, we also wanted to explore the role of self-
complexity and to see whether high or low complexity contributed
to social anxiety.
Study one: self-structure and social anxiety
Method
Participants
Ninety-eight undergraduates (70 female and 28 male) aged
between 18 and 57 (M¼ 21.79, SD¼ 6.82) participated in the study.
There were signiﬁcantly more female than male participants, c2
(1, N¼ 98)¼ 18.00, p< .001; however, they did not differ in age
(male, M¼ 23.55, [SD¼ 10.07]; female, M¼ 21.14 [SD¼ 5.11]),
t(96)¼ 1.59, p¼ .12.
Measures
Descriptive measures
Social Interaction and Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke,
1998). The version of the SIAS that we used contained 19 items
that are rated on a ﬁve-point scale from 0 (not at all characteristic or
true of me) to 4 (extremely characteristic or true of me). The SIAS is
scored by summing the ratings and total scores range from 0 to 76.
The internal consistency of the SIAS in this study was high (a¼ .89)
and participants had moderate levels of social anxiety overall
(M¼ 24.83, SD¼ 11.32).
Beck Depression Inventory-Two (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown,
1996). The BDI-II consists of 21 items rated on 0 (not at all) to 3
(severely) scales, and the total scores range from 0 to 63. The BDI-II
has excellent psychometric properties (Beck et al., 1996; Dozois,
Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998). In this study, the internal consistency
of the BDI-II was good (a¼ .79) and participants had mild levels of
depression overall (M¼ 8.78, SD¼ 5.97).
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1989). The RSES
taps global self-esteem and consists of 10 items rated on 1 (strongly
agree) to 4 (strongly disagree) scales. Total scores range from 1 to 40.
Positive items were reverse-scored so that higher scores indicated
higher self-esteem. The internal consistency of the RSES in this
study was high (a¼ .86) and participants reported high self-esteem
overall (M¼ 3.10, SD¼ 0.46). The RSES correlates highly with self-
concept clarity (r¼ .61; Campbell et al., 1996), which provided
another reason to control for the effects of self-esteem when
examining the impact of self-concept clarity on social anxiety.
Self-descriptive card-sorting task. Self-organisation was measured
using Showers’ (1992; Showers & Kling, 1996) version of a card-
sorting task originally developed by Zajonc (1960) and adapted by
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given a deck of 40 cards, which contains 20 positive and 20 negative
personality attribute words. Table 1 shows the words used in this
study. The positive and negative words did not differ in length,
t(48)¼ 0.83, p¼ .41, number of syllables, t(48)¼ 0.27, p¼ .79, or
word-frequency, t(48)¼ 1.81, p¼ .08. Participants sort the cards
into groups that describe an “aspect of yourself or your life”. They
are instructed to think of as many aspects as they wish that are
meaningful in describing their selves. Next, they label each self-
aspect (e.g. friend, daughter, student) and record the numbers of
the cards that they have selected as descriptive of that self-aspect.
There are no limits to how many cards a participant can choose to
describe a self-aspect and duplicate cards across self-aspects are
permitted. This procedure is repeated until the participant has
ﬁnished identifying self-aspects.
The card-sorting task provides the following four measures of
self-structure:
1. Self-organisation (integration versus compartmentalisation). We
followed Showers’ (1992) method of calculating self-organi-
sation, which uses the phi statistic (also known as Cramer’s V,
Cramer, 1974). Phi is essentially a normalised chi-square
statistic in which the expected frequencies represent chance
values for the number of positive and negative attributes in
each self-aspect (e.g. if the proportion of positive to negative
attributes across the whole sort is 6:4 then you would expect
the same ratio in each self-aspect), and the observed frequen-
cies are obtained from the actual proportions used in the card
sort. Scores can range from 0 (total integration) to 1 (total
compartmentalisation). In this sample, overall, participants
displayed a slight tendency towards compartmentalisation
(M¼ 0.57, SD¼ 0.23).
Phi scores can only be computed for individuals who have at
least two negative attributes in their card sort (Showers &
Kevlyn, 1999). Three participants were excluded from the
analysis because they did not satisfy this criterion.
2. Differential importance. Participants rate the importance of each
self-aspect and how positive and negative it is. Differential
importance is the within-subject correlation between valence
ratings and importance ratings and ranges from 1 (negative
attributes are most important) to þ1 (positive aspects are most
important) (Showers, 1992). Overall, participants rated theirTable 1
Positive and negative personality attributes used in the self-descriptive card-sorting
task.
Positive attributes Negative attributes
Conﬁdent Failure
Friendly Humiliated
Popular Inferior
Assertive Lonely
Successful Stupid
Articulate Boring
Appealing Judged
Charming Embarrassed
Funny Vulnerable
Entertaining Inept
Sociable Unpopular
Accepted Idiotic
Interesting Ignored
Self-assured Inhibited
Likeable Ashamed
Pleasant Shy
Sincere Unkind
Thoughtful Insensitive
Realistic Inﬂexible
Loyal Clumsypositive self-aspects as more important than their negative
ones (M¼ 0.64, SD¼ 0.34).
3. Proportion of negative attributes. This is calculated by dividing
the number of negative attributes in a respondent’s card sort by
the total number of attributes, which produces scores that
range from 0 to 1. Participants in this sample reported
a moderate proportion of negative attributes (M¼ 0.26,
SD¼ 0.13).
4. Self-complexity. We followed Rafaeli-Mor, Gotlib, and Revelle’s
(1999) recommendations and used the number of self-
aspects (NSA) and the overlap (OL) between different self-
aspects to measure self-complexity. The OL reﬂects the degree
of similarity between the different self-aspects and can range
from 0 (no overlap) to 1 [total overlap: see Rafaeli-Mor et al.
(1999) for full details of how to calculate the OL]. Rafaeli-Mor
et al. demonstrated that these two indices have good reliability,
measure self-structure independently of content or valence,
and represent two independent dimensions of self-complexity.
The mean NSA score was 5.39 (SD¼ 1.43) and the number of
self-aspects used by participants in this sample ranged
between three and nine. The mean OL score was 0.27
(SD¼ 0.2). The correlation between NSA and OL was
r(95)¼.17 (p¼ .10), which supports the argument that these
two-dimensions of self-complexity are independent. Self-
aspects drawn from the social context dominated in frequency,
with ‘friend’ (28%), ‘student’ (26%), and ‘romantic partner’ (16%)
being identiﬁed as the ﬁrst self-aspect. Other less easily clas-
siﬁed terms included examples such as ‘drinker’ and ‘house-
holder’. The speciﬁc domains from which participants drew
their self-aspect categories mixed both nouns (e.g., friend,
student) and evaluative descriptors of the self, such as ‘happy’
or ‘realistic’. Although the majority of participants provided at
least one noun self-category, there were three who provided
only evaluative descriptors including ‘self-beliefs’, ‘work ethic’,
and ‘honesty’ for example.
Self-Concept Clarity Scale (SCCS; Campbell et al., 1996). The SCCS
contains 12 items measuring the extent to which an individual’s
self-concept is clearly deﬁned and stable. Individuals rate each item
on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
A total score was computed by taking the mean of all the items,
with higher scores indicating more self-concept clarity. In this
study, the internal consistency of the SCCS was high (a¼ .90) and
participants’ mean self-concept clarity score was 3.13 (SD¼ 0.76).
Procedure
Participants completed the study in groups of one to seven,
seated at individual cubicles. The self-descriptive card-sorting task
was completed ﬁrst, followed by the supplementary ratings for
each of the self-aspects in participants’ card sorts, and then by
measures of social anxiety, depression, self-esteem, and self-
concept clarity, which were counterbalanced across participants to
control for order effects. One of the experimenters (MB) remained
in the testing room throughout the study.Results1
Correlations between self-structure and other variables
Table 2 shows the correlations between all of the measures
included in this study. Social anxiety (SIAS scores) was positively1 We checked for gender differences on the dependent measures, but there were
none (all ps< .12) and there were no interactions involving gender. Therefore
gender was not considered as a factor in any of the subsequent analyses.
Table 2
Study 1: correlations between social anxiety, measures of self-structure and depression and self-esteem (n¼ 95).
Measures SIAS Phi PNeg DI NASPECTS OL SCCS BDI-II RSES
SIAS e .28** .40*** .35*** .14 .14 .55*** .50*** .51***
Card-sorting task
Self-organisation (phi) e .40*** .32** .26* .55*** .13 .19 .19
Proportion of negative attributes (PNeg) e .57*** .20* .62*** .26* .40*** .43***
Differential importance (DI) e .13 .39** .30** .31** .44***
Self-complexity
NASPECTS e .17 .15 .03 .19
OL e .10 .12 .07
Self-Concept Clarity Scale (SCCS) e .55*** .66***
BDI-II e .51***
RSES e
Note. SIAS, Social Interaction and Anxiety Scale; BDI-II, Beck Depression Inventory-II; RSES, Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; NASPECTS, number of self-aspects that participants
generated from their card sorts; OL, the similarity between the different self-aspects.
*p .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001.
2 For exploratory purposes we also entered all of the two-way interaction at step
3. The overall model was signiﬁcant, F(21, 94)¼ 6.44, p< .001, R2¼ .65, and
explained an additional 23% of the variance in social anxiety scores. The following
interactions were signiﬁcant: SCC phi, t(94)¼3.44, p< .05, partial sr2¼ .06;
SCCDI, t(94)¼3.15, p< .005, partial sr2¼ .05; phi proportion of negative
attributes, t(94)¼2.19, p< .05, partial sr2¼ .02; self-esteem depression, t(94)¼
3.34, p< .005, partial sr2¼ .05, depressionphi, t(94)¼2.19, p< .05, partial
sr2¼ .02, and depressionproportion of negative attributes, t(94)¼ 2.31, p< .05,
partial sr2¼ .03.
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a higher proportion of negative attributes in participants’ card
sorts. Social anxiety was negatively correlated with both self-
concept clarity and with differential importance (DI), which
shows that increases in social anxiety were associated with both
reduced clarity and with reduced importance ratings of positive
self-aspects. Social anxiety was not signiﬁcantly correlated with
either of the self-complexity measures, but this may have been
due to the absence of a stressor and will be addressed in the
discussion.
As expected, social anxiety was positively correlated with
depression (BDI-II) and negatively correlated with self-esteem
(RSES). The BDI-II scores were positively correlated with the
proportion of negative attributes and negatively correlated with
self-concept clarity, and differential importance. The RSES scores
were positively correlated with differential importance and with
self-concept clarity, but negatively correlated with proportion of
negative attributes. Again, all of these correlations are in the
expected direction and are consistent with the literature on self-
esteem (Bouvard et al., 1999; Campbell et al., 1996).
Multiple regression to investigate the role of self-structure in social
anxiety
To investigate the impact of self-structure on social anxiety we
conducted a step-wise multiple regression with SIAS scores as the
outcome variable. At step 1, we entered BDI-II and RSES scores as
predictor variables in order to control for their contributions to
social anxiety. At step 2, we entered self-organisation (phi), self-
concept clarity, differential importance (DI), and the proportion of
negative attributes as predictors. We excluded the two measures of
self-complexity (NSA and OL) from the regression because they
were not correlated with social anxiety scores. At step 3, we
entered the predicted interactions between self-organisation (phi)
and differential importance (DI), and between self-organisation
(phi) and self-concept clarity. All continuous predictor variables
were centred for the purposes of testing interactions (Aiken &
West, 1991)
Table 3 summarises the regression analysis. At step 1, the whole
model was signiﬁcant, F(2, 94)¼ 24.33, p< .001, R2¼ .35. Depres-
sion, t(94)¼ 3.14, p< .01, sr2¼ .07, and self-esteem, t(94)¼3.77,
p< .001, partial sr2¼ .1 were both signiﬁcant predictors of social
anxiety. At step 2, the model was signiﬁcant, F(6, 94)¼ 10.6,
p< .001, R2¼ .42, but the only unique predictor was self-concept
clarity, t(94)¼2.50, p< .01, partial sr2¼ .04. The inclusion of the
self-structure variables at step 2 accounted for an additional 7% of
the variance in social anxiety scores.At step 3, the model was signiﬁcant,2 F(8, 94)¼ 8.72, p< .001,
R2¼ .65, and explained an additional 3% of the variance in social
anxiety scores. The interaction between phi and SCC was signiﬁ-
cant, t(94)¼2.06, p< .05, partial sr2¼ .03. The interaction
between phi and DI was not signiﬁcant, t(94)¼ 0.34, p¼ .73.
Fig. 1 shows the interaction between compartmentalisation
(phi) and self-concept clarity using simple slopes tests that
represent scores one standard deviation above and below the
mean. Individuals with a compartmentalised self-organisation are
more socially anxious when self-concept clarity is low than when
it is high (t(94)¼4.05, p< .001). However, compartmentalised
self-organisation produces more social anxiety than integrated
organisation when participants have low self-concept clarity
(t(94)¼ 4.03, p< .001). For individuals with a more integrated self-
organisation, level of self-concept clarity did not affect social
anxiety (t(94)¼ 1.31, p¼ .20). However, there was a trend for
integrated self-organisation to produce higher social anxiety than
compartmentalised self-organisation when participants had
higher self-concept clarity, t(94)¼ 1.95, p¼ .06.Discussion
The ﬁrst study in this paper examined whether three elements
of self-structure e evaluative self-organisation, self-complexity,
and self-concept clarity e contributed to social anxiety measured
by a scale that can reliably discriminate between social anxiety and
depression. The results demonstrate that self-structure does have
a role to play in social anxiety even after taking account of the
impact of depression and self-esteem, which accounted for 35% of
the variance in social anxiety scores when they were entered into
the multiple regression as sole predictors. When self-concept
clarity and the four indices of self-organisation were added to the
regression, they accounted for a further 7% of the variance in social
anxiety scores, and the interaction between self-concept clarity and
compartmentalisation accounted for a further 3% of the variance in
social anxiety scores.
Table 3
Study 1: hierarchical regressions of social anxiety onto measures of self-concept
structure and content, depression, self-esteem, and their interactions.
Social anxiety
Variables B SE B b sr sr2
Step 1
Constant 24.83 0.95
Depression 0.58 0.19 .31 .26 .07***
Self-esteem 0.87 0.23 .37 .32 .10***
Step 2
Constant 24.75 0.92
Self-concept clarity (SCC) 0.36 0.14 .29* .20* .04*
Phi 6.04 4.46 .12 .11 .01
PNeg 9.40 9.29 .11 .08 .00
Differential importance (DI) 1.38 3.45 .04 .03 .00
Step 3
Constant 24.60 0.94
Phi SCC 0.95 0.46 .18** .22** .03**
PhiDI 4.23 12.37 .03 .04 .0007
Note: n¼ 95; step 1; R2¼ .35 (p< .001, f2¼ 24.33); step 2; R2¼ .42 (p< .05,
f2¼ 2.79); step 3; R2¼ .45 (p< .001, f2¼ 3.19);. PNeg, proportion of negative attri-
butes in participants card sorts; sr¼ semi-partial correlation; sr2¼ squared semi-
partial correlation (represents the proportion of variance uniquely accounted for by
each predictor, beyond that accounted for by all predictors at that step).
*p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001.
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social anxiety would be associated with more negative compart-
mentalisation, and although this did appear to be the case when
we looked at the correlations, the picture was much more
complicated in the regression. Here, none of the measures of self-
organisation (phi, differential importance [DI], and proportion of
negative attributes) uniquely predicted social anxiety. However, as
noted above, compartmentalisation (phi) interacted with self-
concept clarity and a compartmentalised self-organisation was
associated with higher levels of social anxiety when self-concept
clarity was low, but not when it was high; whereas integrated
self-organisation was not inﬂuenced by self-concept clarity and
was preferable to compartmentalised organisation when clarity
was low.
In this study, there was no correlation between either of the
measures of self-complexity (number of self-aspects and overlap
between self-aspects), which seems to indicate that self-
complexity does not have a role to play in social anxiety. However,15
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Fig. 1. Predicted values for social interaction anxiety, illustrating the interaction of
evaluative self-organisation (phi) and self-concept clarity, at values that are one
standard deviation below and above the mean for Study 1.before we reach this conclusion, it is important to note that the
absence of an effect could be due to the fact that participants
completed the study in conditions of low stress. There is evidence
to suggest that self-complexity has an effect when participants are
put under stress (Linville, 1985, 1987; Showers, Abramson, &
Hogan, 1998). If this is the case, then the methodology of this
study would not have allowed us to discover how self-complexity
affects social anxiety and it would be premature to conclude that
this element of self-structure does not contribute to social anxiety.
Subsequent investigations of self-structure should consider
measuring self-complexity before and after a socially relevant
stress test, such as the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST; Kirschbaum,
Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993).
The results of this study clearly point to self-concept clarity as
being one of the important structural variables contributing to
social anxiety. Self-concept clarity was the only unique predictor of
social anxiety when the structural variables were entered into the
regression separately, and there was a signiﬁcant interaction
between self-concept clarity and compartmentalisation. The
importance of self-concept clarity in the ﬁrst study is consistent
with both Wilson and Rapee (2006) and Moscovitch et al. (2009),
who found reduced certainty about self-variables in participants
with social phobia. Showers et al. (2004) suggest that therapy may
lead to changes in evaluative self-organisation, but it is also
possible that therapy may help individuals to have a clearer and
more consistent conception of themselves. However, in the present
study, we relied on a single self-report measure of self-concept
clarity, which did not take valence into account and could have
been subject to social desirability bias. If self-concept clarity does
indeed have an important contribution to make to social anxiety,
then we need to overcome these problems. To this end, we con-
ducted a second study inwhichwe used a computerisedmeasure of
self-consistency as well as the questionnaire measure used in the
ﬁrst study. The computerised task included separate measures of
positive and negative consistency, and because it did not rely on
self-report, it wasmuch less likely to be subject to social desirability
biases.
Study two: self-concept clarity and social anxiety
Introduction
In study two, we compared high and low socially anxious
participants on the samemeasures of self-structure that we used in
study one, and included a computerised measure of self-concept
clarity, which was an adapted version of Markus’ (1977) me/not-me
self-description task. This task allowed us to measure consistency
of self-view, which is another way of conceptualising self-concept
clarity, and also to sample the individual’s degree of conﬁdence
about self-related judgments. The me/not-me task also allowed us
to derive separate measures of positive and negative consistency;
for example, high socially anxious individuals may be quite certain
about negative aspects of self-view, but less certain about positive
aspects of self-view. By comparison, low socially anxious individ-
uals may be clear and conﬁdent about both negative and positive
aspects of self-view.
We predicted that the high socially anxious group would have
lower self-concept clarity overall and that they would be less
consistent and less conﬁdent in their judgments about whether
words were self-descriptive. We thought it would be likely that
high socially anxious participants would be more negatively and
less positively consistent than low socially anxious participants and
that they would have a more compartmentalised self-organisation.
Based on the ﬁndings of the ﬁrst study, we did not expect to ﬁnd
any differences between the two groups in self-complexity.
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Participants
Individuals from a local university (students and staff) and from
the local community were screened using an on-line version of the
SIAS (Mattick & Clarke,1998). Participants who scored one standard
deviation above (29) or below (9) Mattick and Clarke’s under-
graduate mean (19.0) were invited to take part. The SIAS was
repeated at the time of testing and participants were excluded if
their scores did not fall within the cut-offs. The high socially
anxious group (5 males, 21 females) had a mean age of 28.59
(SD¼ 13.65) and the low socially anxious group (9 males, 17
females) had a mean age of 27.23 (SD¼ 14.38). There were no
signiﬁcant differences between the two groups in either age,
t(50)¼0.33, p¼ .75, or in gender composition, c2(1, N¼ 52)¼
1.56, p¼ .21. Participants were screened for social phobia on the
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-TR Axis 1 Disorders, Non-
Patient Edition (SCID-I/NP; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, &Williams, 2002)
of the SCID by one of the experimenters (MB) who was trained by
LS (an experienced Research Clinical Psychologist). Eight out of 26
(30.8%) high socially anxious participants met DSM-IV criteria for
social phobia. None of the low socially anxious participants met
criteria for social phobia. All of the SCID interviews were recorded
and LS coded 28% of the interviews without knowing the status of
the participant. Therewas 100% agreement between the two coders
on the diagnostic status of the participants in the sample used to
test the reliability of the coding. Table 4 shows the mean scores for
each group for the SIAS, BDI-II, and RSES. These scores were
compared using multivariate analysis of variance. There was
a signiﬁcant effect of group, F(1, 51)¼ 66.03, p< .001, hp2¼ .88. As
expected, the high socially anxious group had signiﬁcantly higher
scores on the SIAS, F(1, 51)¼ 268.12, p< .001, hp2¼ .84, and the BDI-
II, F(1, 51)¼ 11.39, p< .01, hp2¼ .19, and signiﬁcantly lower scores on
the RSES, F(1, 51)¼ 13.84, p< .01, hp2¼ .22, than the low socially
anxious group.Table 4
Study 2: characteristics of participants in each social anxiety group.
Variable High social anxiety Low social anxiety
M SD M SD
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale 42.19 10.78 6.96 2.02
Beck Depression Inventory-Two 13.92 10.59 5.26 7.66
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 2.76 0.67 3.36 0.46
Self-Concept Clarity Scale 2.53 0.82 3.82 0.80
Me/not-me task
Consistency
Total consistency 17.96 3.43 22.38 1.9
Positive internal consistency 11.61 6.58 21.76 2.80
Negative internal consistency 6.42 5.22 0.69 1.37
Conﬁdence ratings
Positive adjectives 5.07 0.26 5.58 0.56
Negative adjectives 5.01 0.32 5.62 0.58
Reaction times
Positive adjectives 1892.5 586.1 1602.6 499.8
Negative adjectives 1980.3 528.0 1724.6 436.5
Self-descriptive card-sorting task
Number of self-aspects 5.88 1.97 5.62 2.32
Total number of attributes 64.92 40.22 55.73 27.42
Self-organisation (phi) 0.50 0.23 0.26 0.60
Differential importance 0.37 0.56 0.23 0.59
Proportion of negative attributes 0.33 0.19 0.15 0.16
Self-complexity
Number of self-aspects 5.88 1.97 5.61 2.31
Overlap 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.22Participants took part in the study for either course credit or
a small payment of £6.00 ($10.00).
Measures
The SIAS, BDI-II, and RSES are described above. In this study, the
internal consistencies of the SIAS, BDI-II, and RSES were all high
(as¼ .96, .94, and .91 respectively). The self-descriptive card-sort-
ing task and the Self-Concept Clarity Scale are described in the
method section of study one.
Me/not-me self-description task (Markus, 1977). Participants
respond ‘Y’ or ‘N’ to individual words presented in the centre of
a computer screen depending on whether the word is self-
descriptive or not. The word remains on the screen until the
participant responds or until eight seconds have elapsed. An
asterisk appears on the screen for one second and then participants
rate how conﬁdent they feel about the ‘Y’/‘N’ response on a 1 (not at
all conﬁdent) to 7 (extremely conﬁdent) scale. There were 10 practice
trials followed by 50 experimental trials.
The me/not-me task used 25 word pairs (sociableeunfriendly, wit-
tyedull, comfortableeawkward, signiﬁcanteinsigniﬁcant, cleverefoolish,
capableeincompetent, boldetimid, interestingeboring, conﬁdente
embarrassed, successfulefailure, popularedisliked, friendlye
disagreeable, acceptedeignored, appealingeuninspiring, self-assurede
insecure, assertiveeinhibited, kindeselﬁsh, patienteirritable, maturee
immature, intelligentestupid, talentedeinept, adaptableeinﬂexible,
hardworkingelazy, outgoingeshy, imaginativeeuninteresting), which
comprised a mixture of trait descriptors selected from the pool of
wordsused toderive the40adjectives inStudy1becausemostof them
were relevant to social anxiety. Order of presentationwas randomised
across the 50 individual words. Positive and negative words did
not differ signiﬁcantly in length, t(48)¼ 0.50, p¼ .62, hp2¼ .01, number
of syllables, t(48)¼ 0.57, p¼ .01, hp2¼ .28, or in frequency of usage,
t(48)¼ 1.62, p¼ .11, hp2¼ .03.
The me/not-me task produces three measures of self-struc-
ture: consistency, conﬁdence ratings (1e7), and response times.
Consistency is deﬁned as saying yes to one word and no to its
antonym or vice versa. Consistent responses are scored as one
and inconsistent responses are scored as zero. Therefore scores
range from 0 to 25 and higher scores reﬂect more consistent
responses. Total consistency scores do not take valence into
account, and therefore we constructed separate scores for posi-
tive and negative consistency. Positive consistency involves
saying yes to a positive word and no to a negative word; whereas
the reverse is true for negative consistency. Scores on each scale
range from 0 to 25 with higher scores indicating more positive or
negative consistency respectively. For a participant who said yes
to every positive word and no to every negative word, the total
consistency score would be 25; the positive consistency score
would be 25 and the negative consistency score would be 0.
Although the sum of the positive and negative consistency scores
should be equal to the total consistency score, the proportion of
items in the positive and negative consistency scales will vary
across participants.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually. First, they signed
a consent form and completed the BDI-II. Next, they completed
either the self-descriptive card-sorting task followed by the me/
not-me task, or the reverse as presentation order was counter-
balanced across participants. Next, they completed the RSES,
SCCS, and the SIAS (also counterbalanced across participants).
Finally, the researcher administered the SCID-I/NP to all
participants.
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Fig. 2. Mean positive and negative internal consistency scores for low and high social
anxiety groups for Study 2.
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An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical tests, except
whenwe explored interactions where a Bonferroni corrected alpha
was used to control for inﬂation of the Type I error rate.3 We used
one-tailed tests to compare the groups on the Self-Concept Clarity
Questionnaire and on compartmentalisation (phi), as these were
essentially replications of the ﬁndings in Study 1. All other tests
were two-tailed. In order to control for the associations between
social anxiety, depression, and self-esteem, all analyses were
initially conducted using depression and self-esteem scores as
covariates. We report ANCOVAs where the covariates had a signiﬁ-
cant effect and ANOVAs where they did not.
Self-concept clarity
Self-Concept Clarity Scale. Table 4 shows the mean scores for all the
self-structure variables reported below. High socially anxious
participants reported signiﬁcantly lower self-concept clarity than
low socially anxious participants, F(3, 52)¼ 20.45, p< .001, hp2¼ .30.
Depression also had a signiﬁcant effect on self-concept clarity,
F(3, 52)¼ 18.55, p< .001, hp2¼ .28; as depression scores increased,
self-concept clarity decreased, rs¼.70, p< .001. Self-esteem was
not signiﬁcant (p¼ .1).
Me/not-me self-description task
Consistency scores. High socially anxious participants had
signiﬁcantly lower total consistency scores than low socially
anxious participants, F(1, 52)¼ 33.02, p< .001, hp2¼ .4, Positive and
negative internal consistency were analysed using a 2 (Group) 2
(Valence) mixed design ANCOVA. There was a main effect of group,
F(1, 48)¼ 15.61, p< .001, hp2¼ .25, but no effect of valence,
F(1, 48)¼ 0.15, p¼ .70, hp2¼ .00. However, there was a signiﬁcant
group by valence interaction, F(1, 48)¼ 24.17, p< .001, hp2¼ .34,
which is illustrated in Fig. 2. High socially anxious participants gave
signiﬁcantly more negatively consistent responses, t(1, 50)¼ 5.41,
p< .001, hp2¼ .11, and signiﬁcantly fewer positively consistent
responses than low socially anxious participants, t(1, 50)¼7.23,
p< .001, hp2¼ .15.
There were no main effects of the covariates (BDI-II, p¼ .7; self-
esteem, p¼ .69), but there was an interaction between BDI-II and
valence, F(1, 48)¼ 6.9, p< .05, hp2¼ .13. Increases in depression
were associated with increased negative (rs[52)¼ .64, p< .001) and
reduced positive consistency (rs(52)¼.58, p< .001). The interac-
tion between self-esteem and valence just missed being signiﬁcant,
F(1, 48)¼ 4.0, p¼ .052, hp2¼ .08.
Conﬁdence ratings. Conﬁdence ratings for judgments about the
self-descriptiveness of positive and negative trait words were
compared using a 2 (Group) 2 (Valence) mixed design ANOVA.
There was a main effect of group, F(1, 50)¼ 7.59, p< .01, hp2¼ .13, in
which high socially anxious participants gave lower conﬁdence
ratings to all words. There was no main effect of valence, F(1, 50)¼
1.30, p¼ .26, hp2¼ .03, and no group by valence interaction,
F(1, 50)¼ 0.20, p¼ .66, hp2¼ .00.
Response times. Mean response times to make yes/no decisions
were compared using a 2 (Group) 2 (Valence) mixed design
ANOVA. There was a main effect of group, F(1, 50)¼ 3.91, p¼ .05,
hp
2¼ .17, and amain effect of valence, F(1, 50)¼ 7.84, p< .01, hp2¼ .14,
but no valence by group interaction, F(1, 50)¼ 0.21, p¼ .65, hp2¼ .00.
High socially anxious participants were slower to respond to all3 All analyses were initially performed with gender and task order as between-
subjects factors. As there were no signiﬁcant main effects or interactions with
either variable, neither is included in the analyses reported below.words, and all participants took longer to respond to negative
compared to positive words.
Self-descriptive card-sorting task. The high and low socially anxious
groups did not differ on the total number of attributes used in the
card-sorting task, F(1, 50)¼ 0.98, p¼ .34, hp2¼ .09; or on either of
the measures of self-complexity (number of self-aspects, F[1, 50)¼
0.20, p¼ .65, hp2¼ .00; overlap, F[1, 50)¼ 0.21, p¼ .89, hp2¼ .00). The
high socially anxious participants had a more compartmentalised
self-organisation than low socially anxious participants, F(1, 50)¼
3.46, p< .05, hp2¼ .00. However, they did not differ on differential
importance, F(3, 41)¼ 1.69, p¼ .2, hp2¼ .04, or on proportion of
negative attributes, F(3, 48)¼ 1.62, p¼ .21, hp2¼ .03. Self-esteem had
a signiﬁcant effect on proportion of negative attributes, F(3, 51)¼
0.7.1, p< .05, hp2¼ .13, and was on the boundary of signiﬁcance with
differential importance, F(3, 44)¼ 4.07, p¼ .05, hp2¼ .09. Increases
in self-esteemwere associated with a lower proportion of negative
attributes, rs(52)¼.61, p< .001. There was a non signiﬁcant trend
for depression to have an effect on the proportion of negative
attributes (p¼ .06).
Discussion
The aim of study two was to extend the ﬁndings of Study 1 by
comparing self-concept clarity in high and low socially anxious
participants using both the questionnaire measure that we had
used in Study 1 and the computerised me not-me task. As well as
reporting lower levels of self-concept clarity on the questionnaire,
the high socially anxious participants had lower overall consistency
scores, higher negative consistency and lower positive consistency
scores, were less conﬁdent in their own judgments, and took longer
to make decisions about self-descriptive words on the me not-me
task compared to low socially anxious participants. The high
socially anxious participants also had a more compartmentalised
self-organisation than the low socially anxious group, which is
consistent with the correlation between compartmentalisation and
social anxiety found in the ﬁrst study. These ﬁndings will be dis-
cussed in more detail in the general discussion.
L. Stopa et al. / Behaviour Research and Therapy 48 (2010) 955e965 963The inclusion of theme not-me task, which is a novel measure of
self-consistency that does not rely on self-report and that allowed
us to discriminate between positive and negative consistency, is
a strength of the second study and contributes to the small
evidence base suggesting that uncertainty about the self is char-
acteristic of social anxiety. However, one limitation of this study
was our use of analyses of covariance to control for the overlap
between social anxiety, depression and self-esteem. Miller and
Chapman (2001) argue that analysis of covariance often fails to
correct for the variability represented by covariates. Ideally, the
study should be replicated with a larger sample using the regres-
sion approach that we adopted in Study 1, where depression and
self-esteem were entered at step one of the regression analyses, or
using a design in which high socially anxious individuals are
compared with a depressed group and a low self-esteem group
who do not have high levels of social anxiety. Clearly, all of these
alternatives have considerable resource implications as they would
involve recruiting much larger samples. It is also worth noting that
in several of the analyses, the covariates did not have an effect, and
therefore these results represented a straightforward comparison
between the high and low socially anxious groups.
General discussion
The results of both studies demonstrate that social anxiety is
characterised by reduced clarity or certainty about the self. These
effects are present after controlling for self-esteem and depression,
which suggests that lack of clarity about the self may be an
important contributor to social anxiety. In Study 1, self-concept
clarity was the only unique predictor of social anxiety, and also
interacted with compartmentalisation in explaining social anxiety
scores. Study 2 replicated the ﬁnding that high socially anxious
participants had lower scores on the Self-Concept Clarity Scale
(Campbell et al., 1996), and extended this ﬁnding by demonstrating
that, although they were also less consistent about the self overall,
they were more negatively and less positively consistent about the
self than low socially anxious participants. High socially anxious
participants were also less conﬁdent overall about their judgments
than their low anxious counterparts, and this uncertainty may have
been reﬂected by the fact that they took longer overall to make
their judgments about the self-descriptiveness of trait words.
Clarity or consistency about the self is likely to be related to
conﬁdence in judgments about the self, but themodest correlations
between these two sets of variable (.35 conﬁdence and SCQ; .4
conﬁdence and consistency scores on theme/not-me task) suggests
that clarity/consistency and conﬁdence are two different aspects of
self-structure.
The results of these two studies, together with Wilson and
Rapee’s (2006) and Moscovitch et al.’s (2009) ﬁndings, provide
converging evidence for reduced clarity about the self in social
anxiety. Paradoxically, high socially anxious individuals were more
negatively consistent even though overall they were less consistent
in their self-judgments. How could this happen and what effects
might it have? Fig. 2 shows clearly that all participants were more
positively than negatively consistent, which probably explains the
paradoxical effect noted above. This was a non-clinical sample,
although some of the high socially anxious participants did meet
diagnostic criteria for social phobia, and this might account for the
high proportion of positively consistent responses.
The increased negative consistency observed in Study 2 might
contribute to the more stable negative perception of self, which is
a feature of Hofmann’s (2007) model of social anxiety. A persistent
and stable negative self-concept is likely to reduce the individual’s
conﬁdence in his or her ability to achieve desired social goals and
increase belief in the probability of negative outcomes in socialinteractions. Once the individual enters a social situation, self-
focused attention, negative images of self, safety behaviours and
any other strategies that maintain anxiety (see Clark & McManus,
2002, for example) will simply serve to conﬁrm the original
negative view of self. At the same time, the emphasis on the
importance of positive self-attributes will set up a conﬂict between
the individual’s desired and actual selves and may contribute to
overall uncertainty about the self.
Self-concept clarity does in general seem to be beneﬁcial for
people and there is a well-documented relationship between high
clarity and high self-esteem (Campbell, 1990; Campbell & Lavallee,
1993; Campbell et al., 1996). Baumgardner (1990) points out that
self-certainty, which is another way of conceptualising self-concept
clarity, promotes positive affect about the self, and she suggests
that certainty may contribute to a sense of control that leads
individuals to feel that they can inﬂuence future outcomes. This is
consistent with the suggestion made above. If socially phobic
individuals have a more consistent view of negative aspects of self
and a less consistent view of positive aspects, then as well as
creating more overall uncertainty about the self, they may develop
a pessimistic view of future social interaction because they feel that
they have little inﬂuence or control over the outcomes of these
situations.
As well as differences in clarity and consistency, high socially
anxious participants also demonstrated less conﬁdence in their
judgments about self-attributes. This is consistent with Wilson and
Rapee’s (2006) study, where their socially phobic sample had less
conﬁdence in ratings made about the self-descriptiveness of
personality attributes. Like our sample, their participants also took
longer to make judgments about the self. Wilson and Rapee argue
that negative evaluation by other people might have more detri-
mental effects on individuals who are uncertain about themselves.
This is an interesting possibility; reduced certainty about the self
may lead people to give more weight to other people’s opinions. In
the case of social phobia, this might be another route to conﬁr-
mation of the individual’s negative self-views together with
a concomitant difﬁculty in having any conﬁdence in those positive
aspects of self that do exist. There is a consensus across current
models of social phobia (Clark & Wells, 1995; Hofmann, 2007;
Moscovitch, 2009; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) that negative self-
perception is critical in both the development and maintenance of
social anxiety symptoms. The data presented here supports the
argument that this emphasis on the self should be supported by
examining the individual’s degree of certainty about the self and
how any uncertainty might maintain social anxiety.
The relationship between social anxiety and other aspects of
self-structure is more complex. The two studies reported here
included a number of measures of self-organisation, but the only
one which was signiﬁcant was compartmentalisation. Social
anxiety and compartmentalisationwere positively correlated in the
ﬁrst study and high socially anxious individuals had more com-
partmentalised self-organisation than low socially anxious partic-
ipants in the second. However, compartmentalisation was not
a unique predictor of social anxiety in the regression analysis in the
ﬁrst study, but there was a signiﬁcant interaction between com-
partmentalisation and self-concept clarity. This interaction was
particularly interesting because it suggested that compartmental-
ised self-organisation is more likely to produce high levels of social
anxiety than integrated self-organisation, but only when clarity is
low. In fact, integrated self-organisation does not seem to be
affected much by different levels of clarity about the self, and as
such it might offer some protection against the inﬂuence of low
clarity on social anxiety. This interaction hints at the complexity of
the relationship between the structural elements of self, which in
turn will interact with the contents of the self-concept. It would be
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structure of the self-concept and to include clinical as well as
analogue samples.
One central aim of current cognitive treatments is to help the
individual to develop a more accurate and realistic view of self
through the use of methods such as video feedback (Harvey, Clark,
Ehlers, & Rapee, 2000), and converging experimental evidence
suggests that holding a positive image in mind can reduce social
anxiety and improve social performance (e.g., Hirsch, Clark,
Mathews, & Williams, 2003). Showers et al. (2004) suggested that
a shift to more integrated self-organisation may be one of the
beneﬁcial by-products of therapy, but she does not discuss changes
in clarity. This idea is consistent with Brewin’s (2006) retrieval
competition hypothesis, where he argues that therapy inhibits
negative views of the self. What Brewin does not address, however,
is what the effect of therapy would be if an individual does not have
access to more positive views of self. Butler and Holmes (2009)
address this issue indirectly in their discussion about individuals
who lack a sense of self in adulthood as a result of abusive child-
hood experiences. They recommend using imagery and external-
ising images of the self in order to make connections between
thoughts, feelings and memories and to start to develop a repre-
sentation of the current adult self. It is impossible to know at this
stage whether such an approach could also be useful for individuals
with social phobia, who lack positive self-representations. Never-
theless, the success of self-imagery manipulations with individuals
who experience high levels of social anxiety is encouraging.
Our results suggest that we need to examine both changes in
self-organisation and any changes in self-concept clarity that occur
as a by-product of treatment because there may be important
interactions between them. Lack of clarity and/or retaining
a strongly compartmentalised self-organisation could represent
risk factors for relapse. Of course, at the moment this suggestion is
only speculative. However, routine measurement using the Self-
Concept Clarity Scale before, during, and after treatment would be
one simple way to establish whether self-concept clarity changes
and if increased clarity is associated with better maintenance of
treatment gains. It could also be useful for clinicians to directly
explore the degree to which a patient is uncertain about his or her
view of self and to incorporate strategies aimed at increasing clarity
and certainty.
The research reported in Study 2 also indicates that it is
important to distinguish between clarity about negative and posi-
tive aspects of self separately. Although we do not know much
about the best way to achieve this end, the use of imagery might be
a starting point. The deliberate manipulation and changing of
remembered images through techniques, such as imagery
rescripting, might help individuals to increase conﬁdence and
certainty into a more realistic and functional view of self. Imaginal
rehearsal or incorporating a new or more realistic and benign
image of self when remembering social interactions are also
methods that could be used to help the individual to create a more
coherent and consistent view of self. These techniques might work
through inhibiting negative and distorted self-views, thus
rendering them less accessible. There is also scope for thinking
about training consistency of self-judgments, although this would
require considerably more research.
Inevitably the research presented in this paper has a number of
limitations. First we used a non-clinical analogue sample, although
it is noteworthy that a proportion of our high socially anxious group
met diagnostic criteria for social phobia. Although this means that
the research needs to be replicated on patient groups, the results
are consistent with the two previous studies that have used patient
samples (Moscovitch et al., 2009; Wilson & Rapee, 2006). We have
already discussed some of the problems attendant on using analysisof covariance to control for the shared variance between social
anxiety, depression, and self-esteem. Although the regression
analysis used in Study 1 to deal with this problem is perhaps amore
statistically satisfactory approach, it does require much larger
sample sizes and this could be difﬁcult to achieve using patient
samples. The design of the studies reported here do not allow us to
draw any causal inferences about the role of self-structure in social
anxiety, and future studies could address this question by
attempting to manipulate self-structure and then observing the
effects on social anxiety.
To conclude, the main aim of this paper was to investigate
whether self-structure contributed to social anxiety. The twostudies
reported here suggest that some elements of self-structure are
related to social anxiety and deserve further investigation. Self-
concept clarity seems tobeparticularly important, althoughwehave
also argued for a role for self-organisation. Self-complexity was not
related to social anxiety in either of the two studies reported here,
but that may have been due to the absence of any stressor. In prac-
tice, of course, structure does not operate independently of content
and amore complete understanding of the self will only be achieved
when we combine what is already known about the contents of
negative self-views in social phobia with this more recent work on
how self-structure might contribute to social anxiety.
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